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The  FEUDAL  POST·COLONIAL:  THE  FIJ I 
RISIS 
by  VIJAY  MISHRA 
All culture is originarily colonial. -Derrida' 
FOR  TWO  YEARS.  1962  AND  1963,  I  WAS  A  STUDENT 
in the multiracial sixth forms of  Suva Grammar, Fiji's best school. The 
teachers were all white, and only European students or those of Euro-
pean descent could do all their schooling there. But each year children 
from other schools who had gained a first or second division pass in 
the Senior Cambridge examination would be invited to join the lower 
sixth form to study for the New Zealand University Entrance exam. 
I want to share two dialogues from that time. The first was with Mr 
Webb, the school principal. A compassionate but severe-looking man. 
almost totally lacking in humour, he called me into his office before 
announcing to the school that I had been apPOinted a school prefect, 
the fust, it seemed, who had no European blood: 'You'll have prob-
lems from the part-Europeans, they're less likely to accept you, but 
they are really of no consequence, so don't worry about them: But I 
had no problems with them. Keith Williams, Bill Heritage, Molly O'Con-
nor, Robert Southey-the half-castes referred to by Mr Webb-used to 
travel in  the same Shere Punjab bus with me and understood Fiji-
Hindi. Keith and Bill  had had many a mackerel curry and rot; lunch 
at my  home. It was the children of  powerful colonial civil servants 
who were impossible to handle and not beyond sly racist remarks. 
The second dialogue was with Mr Huddleston, the maths teacher. 
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said 'I wish you Indians would leave politics alone, you are causing 
the Fijian so much distress, and they need to be looked after, Perhaps 
the best thing is for them to rule and you to till: He didn't mean to 
hurt, he wasn't that kind of a person, but I recall his words because 
he echoed the sentiments of Europeans in Fiji generally. 
After this year's 19 May coup, no-one from Australia or New Zealand 
referred even remotely to inalienable rights for the Fijian; everyone 
spoke about human rights and democracy, about legitimately elected 
governments and so on. Any concession to primal rights would have 
been an acknowledgement of the special status of indigenous com-
munities in their own countries. I make these observations to indicate 
the winds of change, Thirty years ago, the Indians in Fiji were blamed 
for everything, now they are seen as possessing the same spirit that 
drove the white men to open up new frontiers and colonise new lands, 
A personal prelude ('to the swelling act' of national themes) denudes 
the power of schola.rship in what follows; in the context of this essay, 
perhaps there is a place for precisely that kind of reminiscence. 
The Speight coup of 19 May was a kind of compulsive repetition of 
the Rabuka coup of 14 May 19B7. Both came as a shock, and drew exten-
sive Australian media coverage. But neither coup has yet been the 
subject of  serious theoretical or comparative study. There are few the-
oretical studies of  Fijian politics and culture or the creation of the Fijian 
nation-state, There are no comparative models, no daring analyses, 
subaltern or humanist, that could blast open the national repressed, 
that could, as Walter Benjamin observed in another context, remind 
us of the documents of civilisation as simultaneously documents of 
barbarism, How then do we frame a moment that signifIes a compul-
sion to retum to some lost nirvanic.past, when that moment is simulta-
neously one of  redemption (fOT the Fijian) and betrayal (forthe Indian)? 
1.  Jacques Oerrida,  Monolinguolism of the Orher; or.  rhe prothesis of  origin, trans. 
Patrick Mensah {Stanford University  Press, Stanford,  1998], p.  39. 
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may help us understand the recurring rebellions in Fiji. But first some 
political facts need to be reprised. In the 1998 general elections, the 
first under the revised 1997 constitution, Mahendra Chaudhl)"s Labour 
Party won thirty-seven of  seventy-one seats. Wisely, it seemed then, 
Chaudhl)' entered into a people's coalition government with three 
Fijian parties-the Party of National Unity (PANU), the Fijian Associ-
ation Party (FAP) and Veitokani ni levenivanua Vakaristo (VlY, a Chris-
tian Party), The existence of these parties indicates the fragmentation 
in the Fijian body politic as a result of  the tedious and rudderless Rabu-
ka years. Rabuka's own party won a mere handful of seats, and the 
oldest political party in Fiji, the National Federation Party, won no 
seats at all. Chaudhl)"s huge mandate to' govern was not founded on 
an unequivocal desire on the part of Fijians to embrace a government 
with an Indian prime minister but on Fijian apathy and internal dis-
cord, strategic use of preferential voting and coalitional alignments. 
The support that came from the Fijian president, Ratu Mara, was 
crucial for Chaudhl)"s elevation as prime minister, but Mara's power-
base had been severely eroded during the Rabuka ascendancy. With 
the decline in Mara's moral authority over the Fijian people (he had 
to be secretly whisked out of Government House by the Fijian mili-
tal)' during the coup) the claim by Chaudhl)' to govern because of an 
electoral mandate stood on shifting sand, especially in the context 
of Fiji's recent tempestuous political histol)' and Fijian phobia about 
the spectre of  socialism behind any social-democrat party. Brij Lal has 
carefully summarised the political background to the Speight revolt! 
My interest here is in  the archaeology of a revolt. 
THE  CHARTER of the "AND 
In the highly charged context of Fijian emotion and Fijian phobia 
there is no concept of a mandate to govern that does not simultane-
ously include other mandates held by the Native Land Trust Board, the 
army, and the Great Council of Chiefs. What unifies these instrumen-
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based on democratic principles, is the mystique of the land-Fijian 
land as exclusively the property of the Fijian and the foundation of 
the Fijian sense of the nation-state, 
For a fiji Indian to raise the subject of land is anathema to the Fijian; 
nevertheless, the question has to be raised for two reasons, First, every 
Fiji  Indian has a connection, directly or indirectly, with the Agricul-
tural Landlord and Tenant Act (1969), under which thirty-year leases 
were granted to Indian farmers, Since 1999 these leases have begun 
to expire. Second, Fijian land tenure-and its guardian, the Great 
Council of  Chiefs-has dominated the discourse ofthe crisis. MataqaU, 
tokatoka, yavusa, vallua, matallilu, tabua, vakalutu: the language of 
the native participants (or informants) in the crisis has been littered 
with Fijian words specifically relating to land. For many Indians the 
persistence of  these tenns in the media and in the language of dema-
goguery for which George Speight became famous meant that for the 
first time they began to think through the relationship between Fijian 
social forms and what can only be defmed as a mystical sense of land 
ownership. For the 60,945 landless indentured labourers from  the 
Indo-Gangetic plain and Southern Indian valleys who arrived as 
indentured labourers between 1879 and 1917 the narrative of land 
ownership was different. for them land ownership was a point of entry 
into the psyche ofa feudal (zamindarij system from which, in India, 
they had been excluded. Viewed primarily as a commodity, land had 
yet to be transformed into a mystique. 
'The charter of  the land' is a term from  Peter france's invaluable 
book ofthat name! The supporters of  the 2000 coup obviously believed 
in  the timeless validity ofland tenure without critically addreSSing 
-,-:------'--
2.  Brij V.  Lal, "Chiefs and  thie~es and other people besides': The  making of George 
Speight's coup', unpublished  paper.  School of Pacific History. Australian National 
Univ<:rsity, July 2000. 
3.  Peter France.  The chorrer ofrhe lond: Custom ond colonjzorion in Fiji (O~ford Uni· 
versity Press, Melbourne,  19691. 
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tion and its identifICation with everything Fijian only a reaction to 
the alien (Indian) among us, In Peter France's highly cadenced and 
balanced prose: 
The land tenure system which exists in Fiji today evolved from  the 
varied administrative decisions of a colonial government; it has been 
adopted as a protective device into the Fijian ethos. It has come to 
be regarded as immemorial tradition. For the strength of tradition 
depends less on its historical accuracy than on its social signifIcance. 
And the tradition that is held to enshrine the ancienlland rights of 
Fijians is a powerfully cohesive force in Fijian society. That tradition 
has withstood the protestations and denigrations of a generation of 
economic advisers, and will, no doubt, survive the demythologizing 
labours of historians.' 
As modernity hit Fiji and the nation·s multiracial character became 
self-evident in the mid-twentieth century, even colonial administra-
tors attempted to free up Fijian land for cultivation. (Eighty-three per 
cent ofland in Fiji is Fijian-owned, a further 8.6 per cent is Crown or 
state owned, and just over 8 per cent freehold.) The Spate and Burns 
reports of 1959 and 1960 were critical of  Fijian land tenure and its 
adverse impact on economic development but were rejected outright 
by the Great Council ofChids, an artifIcial body created by the colo-
nial administration, which demanded that 'the present system of Fijian 
land tenure, ownership, administration, and reservation be rigidly 
maintained:' The Great Council of Chiefs became the guardian of the 
land and defended reactionary land tenure practices even when they 
dearly inhibited economic growth. In  opposing change of any kind 
the Great Council of  Chiefs reaffmned the colonial transformation of 
a loose landowning structure into a rigidly feudal one. 
As  the charter of the land becomes part of Fijian national con-
sciousness and the basis of Fijian rights, it becomes difficult, even 
impossible, to rethink the Fijian nation-state in terms of the democ-
ratic Enlightenment etltos. In the latter defmition, the nation-state is 
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its fonnation are not its condition of being. The daims of the landown-
ing class are not identical with the cl'lims of the nation-state, which, 
being an abstraction, an imagined community, comes into being 
because the people who make up that nation share values that they 
want to maintain, and project a common ideal.ln Fiji the nation-state, 
defined in these terms, has failed to take shape because the idea ofthe 
nation-state was mapped onto a fIction of a charter that functioned 
as social reality. This social reality arose out of an absence ofa criti-
cal theory of the nation and out of a response to real or perceived 
threats from a migrant community that within sixty years of its arrival 
became the dominant racial group. A system that is meaningless at 
village level  is defended at the national level as a hallowed and time-
less feature of Fijian national ethos, easily invoked to destroy reason 
and common sense. 
The charter of the land became a catch-cry around which self-inter-
est, especially of the Fijian civil-service establishment, congealed. The 
marriage of the two-defence of the mystique of the land and defence 
of civil-service privileges; one emotional, the other pragmatic-pro-
duced the constant refrain from  both chiefs and bureaucrats during 
the coup: 'We agree with the ends (of the terrorists), but not the means: 
Many who voiced this defence were young civil servants, 'babies of 
1987' as they have been called, who had grown to believe in the Fijian 
divine right to rule, both as permanent secretaries and as superannu-
ated civil servants-cum-government ministers. 
Upon the election of the Chaudhry government, the civil service felt 
terribly threatened. Chaudhry saw that the civil service was bloated 
and not very effective; he saw that it was becoming a racialised endave. 
Readings of  the Africanisation of the civil service in parts of the world 
with large indentured Indian populations-Trinidad, Guyana, Surinam 
---'--
4.  France.  pp.  174-5. 
5.  France,  p.  174. 
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,  -would have convinced him that a civil selVice that does not reflect 
the racial composition ohhe nation is both ineffectual and political-
ly and  racially biased. But the civil service, the military and politics 
were places that could give Fijians-witnout ready access to jobs in 
the private sector, except for the hotel industry-positions of power 
and prestige. In these areas they excelled, especially as the best Indi-
an minds had been leaving the country since 1970. The reduction of 
the compulsory civil-service retirement age from 60 to 55, which freed 
up positions for the growing number of Fijian graduates from the local 
university, also began to create a large class of Fijian ex-bureaucrats 
who looked for salaried jobs in areas still dependent on government 
patronage: Parliament, government-funded statutory bodies, and 
nationalised institutions such as the Fiji Sugar Corporation and the 
National Bank of Fiji. 
If  you agree with the ends, then the means may well justify them. 
With the sacrosanct template of  the charter of the land to invoke, the 
ultimate defender of  the charter, the Great Council of Chiefs, is, accord-
ing to interim government minister and former leader of the Oppo-
sition Ratu Inoke Kubuabola, inviolate and effectively above the 
constitution of the land. Writing in 1964, Rusiate Nayacakalou, 
arguably Fiji's fIrst indigenous intellectual, made the prescient obser-
vation that 'there are very strong demands by Fijians for leadership 
which will guide them back to a pre-eminent position, and contin-
uously afflTm their political demands at the national level'.' Absent 
from  his foresight was the need for a continuing and indeed post-
charter-of-the-Iand critique of Fijian leadership. In its absence, Fijian 
leadership could not be a political fact based on the goodwill of the 
constituency; it required the symbolic (but now progressively real) 
support of Fijian feudal overlords. 
THE  PAX  BRITANNICA 
Foran its ills the Pax Brittanica, from  1874 when the Deed of Cession 
ceded Fiji to Great Britain until Fijian independence in  1970, brought 
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I  peace and prosperity, what V.  S. Naipaul in A bend in the river referred 
to as the 'miraculous peace of the colonial time',' The intrusion of white 
traders into the Pacific had begun early in  the nineteenth century, 
initially as beachcombers, subsequently as small-time planters, ror-
tune hunters and, of  course, missionaries. The white men bought tracts 
of land from Fijian landowners, using muskets, food and European 
consumer commodities for barter. Since there was no overarching 
structure ofland ownership in Fiji, chiefs simply sold land at whim 
without consulting their subjects or neighbouring chiefs. Many white 
traders and planters, especially those from Australia who had inter-
nalised the discourse of  the Aboriginal 'native problem', simply believed 
that 'the native population (was) doomed to the melancholy fate of 
the aboriginal inhabitants of those doomed countries where the sons 
of Japheth have settled without having to encounter the heat of the 
tropics:' There were also land grants in return for other favours. Ratu 
Seru Epenesa Cakobau, the senior chief in Fiji and the first Vunivalu, 
gave William Berwick, an Afro·American, a grant of 3000 acres on 
Koro Island in return for being built a boat. Tui  Kilakila granted the 
island of Kioa to William Owen in  return for a trip on Owen's ketch. 
These acts of generosity on the part of native peoples throughout the 
world are not unusual and should not be read as a weakness. Chiefs 
gave these grants as personal gifts unrelated to consent from their 
subjects. The Deed of Cession probably forestalled massive land sales 
to European settlers and missionaries. Without the deed it is quite pas· 
sible that F~ian alienation from arable land would have been complete. 
Formal cession to Great Britain brought entry into an imperialist 
economy of classic capitalism, followed by the introduction of sugar 
as the base economy and the arrival of Indians. I don't want to dwell 
too long on the history of indenture from  1879, but some points may 
6.  It R.  Naya~akalou, Leadership in Fiji(Oxford University Press. Melbourne. 19751. p. 7. 
7.  V. S.  Naipaul, A bend in the river (Penguin,  London),  p.  40. 
8.  Henry Britton. quoted  in  France.  p.  36. 
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tured labourers, or girmitiyas, who arrived in Fiji  between  1879 and 
1917, While north/south divisions substantially persisted in matters 
of marriage, there was little sense of communal difference because 
they shared Fiji Hindi as their mother tongue, The Muslims among 
them, however, although speaking the same language, were divided 
by strict religious rules, and the creation of Pakistan effectively cre-
ated a distinct homeland for them,  Neither colonial nor Fijian admin-
istrations created political constituencies on the basis of religion, but 
demands for separate Muslim constituencies have persisted, In spite 
of these differences, however, the descendants of girmitiyas have an 
identifiable ethos that goes back to their brief lives asjahaji-bhais, or 
ship-brothers, A further group of  Indians came from  1914 onwards as 
free migrants, Christians came as helping hands of missionaries, Sikhs 
as part of the police force, even a few  Gurkhas as part of the colonial 
military regiment, but most of  these free migrants were Gujerati migrants 
from Surat, who quickly established themselves as smail-time traders 
in the towns and, although never reaching the heights of European 
capitalists, became the face of Indian commercial success, 
A relatively small trading community needs endogamous coherence 
to maintain its commercial advantage, Because they were already 
established in East Africa, Singapore, Hong Kong, even New Zealand, 
Gujeratis could bring husbands and wives from either the transna-
tional diaspora or India if a spouse were not available in Fiji from 
within their caste, They were the only Fiji Indian community to main-
tain their separate language, and in matters of identity their relation-
ship to Fiji was rather different to that of the other Fiji  Indians. Nor 
was their commercial self-interest necessarily identical with that of 
the other Fiji Indians, which is why in  Fiji the term 'girmitiya'-a 
neologism formed from the word 'agreement'-or even 'Hindustani' is 
never applied to them, A trading class is largely indifferent to politi-
cal change. provided that the capitalist economy is not threatened. 
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fat as the Fijians were concerned, the Indian working class (with whom 
the common Fijian had much in common) and the Indian business 
class (which gradually included Gujeratis as well as girmitiyas, and 
with whom the Indian lumpen proletariat had nothing in common) 
were equally Kai Idia vulagis, or 'foreigners from  India: I make these 
points to underline the tenacity of racial politics against the more sen-
sible politics of class. Of course, there is more to it than that, because 
self-interest always produces demagogues who can manipulate race. 
The Pax Britannica, a remarkable colonial interregnum, created just 
the right kind of peace for the Indian community to flourish. The colo-
nial order established the rule of law and the sanctity of property, as 
well as the principle of the right to self-rule. In law, in polities, the Fiji 
Indians excelled, Fiji Indians fought wonderful polilical fights like a 
version of the Ramlila, and became immensely litigiouS. In A house 
for Mr Biswas,  Naipaullooks at the mystique of law with reference 
to Biswas's failure to illsurallbum ('insure and then burn') his shop.' 
Trinidadian Indians, after all, shared the same ethos. A 'race' dragged 
into modernity from  parts of India unaffected by the great ninete<'nth-
century reform movements embraced colonial practices with a 
vengeance.  jQ Whereas the Fijians were still trying to work through 
quaSi-feudal structures with the help of a benign colonial administra-
tion and had no electoral franchise until  196), Indians began to vote 
for their leaders, although in a limited way, from  the 1930s onwards. 
With the constant movement of politically astute people from  India, 
Fiji Indians eaSily invoked the language of Indian nationalism. This 
rhetoric conflated nationalist needs in India with those of the dias-
pora. It has been said by Fijian nationalists that Indians in Fiji  refused 
---'--
9.  V.  S.  Naipaul, A house for Mr Biswos (Penguin  Books. london.  1992). pp. 202-5. 
10  V. S. Naipaul"s foreword to Seepersod Naipoul,  The adventures of  Gurudevo and Olher 
slaries(Andre Deutsch, London. 1976). For a general acrount of Indian indenture his-
tOIY sec Hugh Tinker. A new system of  slavery; The export of  Indian labour overseas 
1830-1920(O~ford University Press, london. 1974). 
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with the Japanese as bad imperialists. In  1941  perhaps there was-
n't a fully articulated ethos of defending a homeland other than 
India, but the absence of Indian involvement in  the war meant a 
failure to produce local heroes; there was no chance of a mini-Gal-
lipoli that could act as a collective myth of the foundational moment 
of the nation-state. In the absence of that shared myth of heroism, 
however, Indians gradually fmessed the political apparatus, forming 
political parties and mastering its discourses. They genuinely believed, 
after Machiavelli, that politics was man's highest calling, without 
recognising that in a racialised Fiji politics might well be, to rephrase 
Derrida's thinking on war, 'a further experience of the gift of death' 
(I give my own life in sacrificing myself for a countJy that is also mine)," 
For Indians, independence in  1970 (and the first post-independence 
elections in  1972) came after some forty years of political participa-
tion; for Fijians, only seven. 
Law, litigation and politics create original positions from which one 
can talk about the common good and the fairness of society. Feudal-
ism, consensus and parochialism, the defming characteristics of the 
Fijian world order, are less likely to do so. In the colonial narrative of 
the reduction of the Other to the One, to what Derrida had termed the 
'Monolingual ism of the Other', Indians were willing participants, So 
why did Indians fight for independence against the serenity of Pax 
Britannica? The Indian argument has always been based on the neces-
sity of a just society and the Indian nationalist reading of the evils of 
imperialism. For the Fijians, who came to universal franchise only in 
1963, Indian idealism was read as Indian duplicity and an extension 
of Indian acquisitive ethos, which the Fijian imaginary cfeated, quite 
mistakenly, out of the successes of  the business community. Although 
when independence came in  1970 the Fijians got everything they 
wanted, the nature of the political process, its language, had been the 
language of Indian bourgeois individualism, Unfortunately, that lan-
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course of  opposition. The Fijians, as members of the ruling party, ruled; 
the Indians opposed. They learnt very little of parliamentary strategy. 
Cabinet, almost exclusively Fijian, made decisions under an imperious 
prime minister, and simply suffered through the ranting and ravings 
of the Indian parliamentary Opposition. No-one recognised the need 
for a government of national unity. 
The peace of the Pax Britannica was shattered and fears of an 
Indian-dominated government set in as early as  1977 when, after 
the second general elections, the primarily Indian National Federa-
tion Party increased its seats. Then, the Governor General probably 
avoided a military coup by appointing Ratu Mara again as prime min-
ister. Ten years later, the Pax Britannica would become a matter of 
even more prolonged nostalgia. That nostalgia had been taking Fiji 
Indians to white settler dominions since independence. The move-
ment became a rush after the 1987 coup and may now become an 
avalanche. 
One may wonder why Indian politicians, aware of  interracial tensions 
elsewhere and the history of  partition in India, did not work towards a 
pact or an understanding with the Taukei, the native Fijians. This may 
well have required some kind of territorial concession on the part of 
the Fijians, some kind of movement of Indians to Indian-dominated 
areas, and the granting of some degree of political autonomy to them. 
That these accommodations didn't ever occur to Indians in Fiji may be 
due to the lack of race riots during the colonial period; the dispersal 
of Indian communities throughout Fiji; the self-interest of  the Indian 
bourgeoisie; and a genuine belief on the part oflndians in Fiji that demo-
cratic institutions and the rule of law would prevail. As the history 
of the post-Soviet world has shown, territorial rights are crucial. This 
is the legacy of  the post-colonial world, a sad statement about definitions 
_-1-_ 
II.  Jacques Derrida,  The gift of  deeth,  traos. David Wills (University of Chicago Press, 
Chicago,  1995], p.  17. 
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gressively read as an absolutist ethnic state-precisely what reactionary 
nation-state theoreticians had always maintained: each people has a 
nation; multicultural nation-states are a contradiction in  terms. 
TilE  FIJIAII  POST-COLOIIIAL 
Rabuka and 1987 created 2000; without the fIrst there would not have 
been the second. All things being equal, the second time around tragedy 
becomes farce, but all things are never equal, and between 1987 and 
2000 much had changed. I have suggested that independence in Fiji 
was fuelled primarily by Indian desire for change. There is little evi-
dence in  the print media of pre-independence Fiji of sophisticated 
Fijian discourses on the subject. The Fiji Times, under the editorship 
of the highly partisan, anti-Indian L. G. Ussher, tried to correct this 
through its editorials and coverage of Fijian political views but these 
were neither as sophisticated nor as highly nuanced as the views 
expressed in the Indian weeklies. Moreover, Fijian politicians until 
1963 were 'nominated members', non-elected civil sClVants who lacked 
the agonistic spirit that can only come from someone outside of the 
civil service. 
The postcolonial moment in Fiji therefore bypassed the Fijian. 
Protected by patronage and the umbrella of  the Great Council of  Chiefs, 
the Fijians had no cause for an anti-colonial struggle against the British. 
In spite of the colonial peace, Indians were always at the vanguard of 
struggle against colonial oppression. So imagine a postcolonial sce-
nario in which, to recall Chateaubriand on the French Revolution, the 
plebians begin a revolution and the patricians finish it. The girmitiyas 
began the struggle, the Fijian civil servants fmished it, winning the 
Treasury bench without even a hint of  anti-colonial struggle. The fmal 
irony is that the plebians, the girmiUyas, are gradually reconstructed 
as symbolic colonisers and the patricians as defenders of the charter 
of the land. The narrative is not as simple as that, but the logic is clear: 
the Indian emerges as the colonial wishing to alienate the Fijians from 
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their land. Combined with Fijian internal dissension and the contin· 
ued feudal concerns of  the Great Council of Chiefs, the Indian as 
scapegoat is both inevitable and useful to demagogues. 
Something else had happened globally: land rights. Fijians began 
to hear calls for indigenous supremacy as a way of preventing per· 
ceived indigenous decline. The old  politics of colonial struggle based 
on utilitarian principles of the common good is placed in  an arena 
where the rhetoric is of persecution of native peoples. In settler nation· 
states this took the form of an anti-colonial struggle (which is why 
First Nation peoples feel  uncomfort<lble with the term 'postcoloni<ll') 
<lgainst the domin<lnt white community. In Fiji, the native Fijian, denied 
the nationalist legacy of  anti-colonialism (Frantz Fanon was meaning-
less to them), used I<lnd rights <IS  <I  me<lns of starting <I  new found<l-
tional narrative of  the nation-state on the basis of  a new (but fictitious) 
<Inti-colonial struggle. In this narrative, the Indian is the object of 
derision and the coloniser, the Fijian the ultim<ltely triumphant slave. 
All the participants in the incarceration of the Chaudhry govern-
ment were Fijians: the police, the military, the chiefs, the proletariat, 
the politicians, even the cook and the butler. And they were all com-
plicit. The air was one of c<lrniv<ll and theatricality, of  sly mimicry and 
parody; the coup was framed, self-consciously, as a local, indigenous 
uprising against colonial spectres. In this political the<ltre the exclu-
sion ofthe Indi<ln was complete. To change this political the<ltre of  the 
absurd would require the mobilis<ltion of  the Indian <IS the re<ll, land-
less underclass. Failing that, it required individual sacrifice-the gift 
of death to their people by Indian politicians. Which raises the fol-
lowing questions: when do we die for a political party? when do we 
die for a nation? when do we die for a cause? Diasporas, of course, 
refuse to die: during the period of incarceration, Indian politicians were 
the first to leave, signing aITtdavits relinquishing their parliamentary 
status. A Fijian woman politician, on the other hand, insisted that she 
return to be with the captives after a two-day 'freedom' on compas-
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sionate grounds, and return she did. The Indian anti-colonial struggle 
could take place only within the Pax Britannica, not outside it. 
THE  KAILOflA 
George Speight is a Kailoma (literally 'child of love'), a part-European, 
derisively referred to in colonial days as half-caste. Symbol of white 
man's guilt, of his phallic power, the Kailoma, like part-Europeans 
elsewhere, were treated with unusual care by the colonial masters. 
Their women, it was claimed, desired nothing better than being accept-
ed into the fold  of the white coloniser; their men worked tirelessly as 
second-order colonial functionaries. They could attend Suva Grammar 
School {though invariably placed in the B streams} and swim in the 
Suva Sea Baths. They have a long history in Fiji, longer than that of 
the ginnitiyas. One of  their more common surnames goes back to David 
Whippy who arrived in Levuka in 1824 and was given protection by 
the Tui Levuka, who came to be called Tamani-kaivavalagi ('Father of 
the white men'). Other names-Simpson, Williams, Walker, Lobendahn, 
Pickering, Speight-can be traced to beachcombers or planters. In colo-
nial times they saw themselves as a race apart, and certainly not Fijian. 
Their privileges were on the wane after 1970 when the postcolonial 
Fijian nation-state began to be perceived as a product of a partner-
ship between the indigenous Fijian and the migrant Indian. Political-
ly defined as 'general voters', they had neither the erstwhile imperialist 
clout of  the European nor the entrepreneurial skills of  the Chinese, races 
who were politically categorised as 'generar. Since they had always 
depended upon patronage, their decline was dramatic. They were 
among the fIrst to migrate in relatively large numbers because as part-
Europeans they were readily accepted into Australia and New Zealand. 
Those who remained attached themselves initially to  foreign compa-
nies and disappeared from sight. To them the Fijian nation-state had 
become very much a Fijian-Indian affair. 
Prior privileges are hard to forget, and the Kailoma who stayed 
behind gradually began to redeflfle themselves. The Kailoma estab-
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Indian. On  formal occasions they discarded trousers and opted for the 
sulu, as Speight himself did during the coup. In  1987 their support of 
Rabuka was strong, although not visible. During the Rabuka years 
they re-entered the Voka  Ni Kawa Bu/a, the register of Fijian geneal-
ogy, and flourished once again. Like the Great Council of Chiefs this 
register was a colonial invention, recording the names of all Fijians at 
birth and classifYing them in terms of  their clan. Illegitimacy was never 
an issue: recognition by the clan was all that mattered. Speight redefmed 
himself as an indigenous Fijian of the Tailevu province, dressed in a 
sulu, and styled himself as the saviour of his people. He linked him-
self to the Kubuna-Bau confederacy, the most powerful in colonial 
times but on the decline since independence. With an eye to signif1-
cant prof1ts for himself, he promised Fijian landholders the proceeds 
of the mahogany plantations that had reached maturity. The money 
involved would have been hundreds of thousands of  dollars, enough 
for a small country and with careful management, harvesting and 
replanting probably available in perpetuity. The benef1ciaries of any 
such deal would have been the Kubuna confederacy on whose lands 
much of the mahogany stood. Speight became the spokesperson for 
this major prize, having been involved in negotiations with the Fiji gov-
ernment on behalf of  Trans Resources Management (TRM) before he was 
sacked by the Chaudhry government from  his position as chairman of 
the Fiji  Pine Commission and the Hardwood Corporation. 
The heroism almost worked and the rehabilitation of the Kailoma 
would have been complete had it not been for Speight (and his chief 
strategist, the ex-SAS soldier Major IIisoni Ligcliri) pre-empting a swift 
military coup and the establishment of a government not unlike the 
present interim one. The Fijian talanoas (discussions around the kava 
bowl) had been full of talk about a coup once seasoned soldiers over-
seas on UN  peace-keeping work returned home in late June. For while 
mahogany was attractive to Fijian landowners, political power was 
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crucial for a Fijian establishment that had grown fat on civil-service 
pay checks. The chiefs wielded considerable mOTal  power but had no 
money or legal power. The civil servants had no moral power but had 
access to money and the nation's reserves. For taking the wind out of 
their sails, the Fijian establishment and the military hated Speight and 
his motley crowd: for what they saw as the outcome, they loved him. 
Which is why the performance. the theatre, the fa,ade of concern 
for the overthrow of the Chaudhry government continued for so long. 
As I write, the theatricality continues with the trial of Speight and 
his followers. If Speight is  found guilty it is  not because he com-
mitted treason (which is how it will be seen by Australia and New 
Zealand, Fiji's strongest critics) but because he made such a mess 
of the treasonable act. 
Ratu Mara understood one thing very well: he recognised the dan· 
gers of the Great Council of Chiefs wielding anything but symbolic 
authority. Once a year it passed motions about Fijian advancement, 
expressed the usual unease about the rising numbers of Indians, but 
these results were never debated in  parliament. For the Indian parlia· 
mentary Opposition, the Great Council of Chiefs was feudal, a colo· 
nial relic irrelevant to the modern nation·state. Since 1987, and with 
the end of Mara's power, the Great Council of Chiefs has become both 
moral voice and legislator, counsel as well as parliament. This ascen· 
dancy (or fusion of powers) will  make democracy in Fiji impossible, 
something the Indian diaspora never really understood, 
TNE  INDIAN  DIASPORA 
We were a landless people, we came from parts of India untouched by 
reform or social change, It was our fate to be thrust into modernity 
long before our kinsmen back in India, who to this day are living out 
the life of workers under appalling zamindari conditions, or as fringe 
workers in the major cities, Indenture introduced us to industriali· 
sation-steam ships, sugar mills, trains-and transfonned us from caste· 
ridden, illiterate rejects to an enlightened, progressive and relatively 
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attitudes as well, but we were all soon brushed with the capitalist econ-
omy. We became a working class that aspired to the condition of the 
bourgeoisie. And like the bourgeoisie elsewhere we commodified every-
thing: land, education, knowledge. Land was not the mystical source 
of some lost romance, it was a necessity for good living; as was edu-
cation. And herein lies a question that may also be posed as a dilem-
ma: can diaspori<: peoples be anything else but travellers, happy in 
their travel/travail; the nation-state simply an anchoring point for 
material advancement and the homeland always something other than 
the land of our birth? If transience is our condition, if diasporas can 
reconstitute themselves wherever they are, can diasporas die? 
To  grasp hold of a nation one has to  lay claim to it, establish 
moments of heroism that are equally part of the nation's history. The 
coloniser did this through brute force, through territorialisation, 
through phalli<:  power along with the musket: Australia, Canada, 
New  Zealand, South Africa and the USA are testimonials to that. 
The diaspora, more passive, created economies, perhaps even saved 
native peoples, races from extinction, but never affected the imag-
inary of the peoples with whom they lived. In the absence of a nar-
rative of heroism there was no  respect. 
Globalisation and transnationality have now produced the twice-
displaced diaspora of indenture. In  the end, I suspect, the Indian 
diaspora in  Fiji will become even more of a minority as Fiji is read as 
a place of  betrayal. Our numbers in the settler dominions will  increase: 
Canada has 50,000 Fiji  Indians, Australia some 20,000, New Zealand 
another 20,000. There are about 360,000 in  Fiji. Between  1987 and 
1999, Fiji's Indian population dropped from 49 per cent of the total 
to 43  per cent, and could drop to about 35 per cent by the end of 
this decade. 
CONCLUSION 
My interest here has been in the archaeology of a revolt, in trying to 
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theorise the Fiji crisis, not in recounting a chronology of events or 
even offering possibilities for the return of democracy in Fiji. Every 
historical moment carries within a kernel oflhe history of a nation. 
That history, largely diachronically presented in school texts, suddenly 
becomes contaminated by the synchronic moment of  a crisis. We rush 
to our history books and begin to see another pattern, another way of 
ordering, of interpreting, facts. A postmodern historiography needs 
to address minor and alternative narratives, subaltern voices; it needs 
to examine the power oflhe electronic image that transForms, with 
additional political commentary, each synchronic fragment into cod-
ified history. Historical nodal points shift as we are asked to address 
contingent moments and contrary points of view that force us to 
rethink the discourses of  received, empirical histories. 
How can one construct a narrative that is beyond falsification when 
the parties engage in readings of history that are incommensurable? 
Is this again a case of what Lyotard referred to as the differend: a case 
of discourses so  mutuatty exclusive, because they begin from such 
radically different first positions, that there can be no consensus?" 
Indians aware of the partition of the subcontinent on the grounds of 
religious incommensurability know this only too well. 
The difflculty with reducing the Fiji crisis to a single narrative relates 
directly to the incommensurable defmitions of the nation-state given 
by the two dominant races in Fiji. The sense of theatricality and even 
the lack of  seriousness of  purpose that one saw in the electronic images 
of  carnival around the Fiji parliamentary complex certainly pointed 
to this divergent reading. At one level the elements offeast, of  magiti, 
ofironic undercutting and mimicry of  cherished (colonial) institutions 
hold up exceptionatty well to dominant postcolonial theorisations 
about counter-hegemonic and counter-cultural discourses and acts. 
In this sly mimicry (where brown men replace white men as objects 
of derision) even an outdoor Sunday church service is framed in the 
bizarre narrative of exodus and return (of  the Indian): Paula sa lakQ 
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and there were no  more cattle to slaughter, spectators disappeared. 
In the absence of a theory of a nation-state or even an articulated 
sense of  the Fijian's belated moment of'anti-colonialism', no distinctly 
recognisable (in Western pragmatic terms) ideology emerged from  the 
crisis: whatever ideology there was simply reprised the discourse of  a 
(colonial) charter and the privileges that accrue to it. Speight spiked 
his language with the arsenic of racial hatred because he had some 
vague ideas about ethnically absolute nation-states. Perhaps he sim-
ply voiced an unease about the success of a diaspora-how did they 
manage to prosper since 1987 in spite of  every possible impediment?-
and because he was a Kailoma, the reactionary side of the postcolo-
nial hybrid, he introduced a disjunctive discourse into Fijian social 
decorum where certain things always remain unsaid. But Speight was 
never the Fijian equivalent of 'world historical consciousness'; he was 
simply a sign upon whom converged irreconcilable readings of the 
nation-state and irreconcilable expectations of it. 
It may be said that a race needs its anti-colonial struggle, in what-
ever fonn, to redeem itself. The Fijian nation-state has struggled twice 
and made a mess of it on both occasions. Since the Indian diaspora 
has never been the centre of the Fijian imaginary the ultimate lesson 
of  this most recent farce is that Fijians themselves must critically decon-
struct Peter France's conclusion about the colonially constructed 
charter of the land: 'the strength of tradition depends less on its his-
torical accuracy than on its social significance: This knowledge can 
only come to mature nation-states; alas Fiji, the only country that Fiji 
Indians call home, is no longer counted among them. 
12.  Jean·Flan~ois Lyotald.  The differend: Phroses  in dispute.  trans.  Georges Van  Den 
Abbeele  (Manchester University Pless.  Manchester,  1988). 
I am  indebted  to  reports and  commentaries in  the following  newspapers and  websites: 
the Age,  the  Australian, the  Fiji  rimes.  the Sydney Morning Herald,  the  West Austrolil1n; 
http://www.fifidemocrocY.l1sn.l1u htlp://www.sbs.com,ou/insight hllp://fijilive.ner  . 
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